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Article 7

Case Comment
REOPENINGS, REHEARINGS AND
RECONSIDERATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: RE LORNEX MINING CORPORATION
AND B UKWA'
By R. A. MACDONALD*
Traditionally, those who argue for restraint by the courts in the exercise
of their power of judicial review are put in the position of seeming to claim
that protecting the integrity of the administrative process is a higher value
than doing "judicial justice" to individual litigants. Much of their defence
rests on demonstrating that alternatives to review by the courts can be equally
2
effective in superintending or controlling the activity of public authorities.
Expanded political or legislative supervision is one option often advocated. 8
However, it is the deployment of an appropriate array of administrative reme-

© Copyright, 1979, R.A. Macdonald.
Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
1 (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 705, [19761 5 W.W.R. 554 (B.C.S.C.). Much of the confusion in this area results from the fact that a variety of words, each with a differing
nuance, are often used to describe the same phenomenon. Reopenings, rehearings, reconsiderations, reevaluations, reassessments and redeterminations are the most common.
Some of these connote a judicial-type proceeding, i.e., rehearing or redetermination,
others are more neutral, i.e., reopening or reconsideration. It is a principal premise of
this comment that formalistic distinctions are irrelevant to the question of agency reconsiderations, and, therefore, the choice of any of these words in a given context is not
intended to be significant.
2For discussions of such claims, see Hogg, Judicial Review: How Much Do We
Need? (1974), 20 McGil LJ. 157; and Angus, The Individual and the Bureaucracy:
Judicial Review - Do We Need It? (1974), 20 McGill L.J. 177, especially at 158-59,
203-12.
8 Representative of the literature are Powles, Aspects of the Search for Administrative Justice with ParticularReference to the New Zealand Ombudsman (1966), 9 Can.
Pub. Admin. 133; Kersell, Parliamentary Ventilation of Grievances (1959), Pub. Law
152; and Mitchell, Administrative Law and ParliamentaryControl (1967), Pol. Q. 3610.
As noted by Dussault, Traiti de droit administratif canadien et qubdcois (Quebec: Les
Presses de l'universit6 Laval, 1974) at 994-99, this supervision is comprised of legislative debates, question periods, parliamentary committees, public inquiries, motions of
censure, and the activity of the Ombudsman. Parliamentary review of subordinate legislation and administrative procedure are other facets of such control. As to the former,
see the Statutory Instruments Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 38, s. 26; and for the latter, see
The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47, ss. 26-34.
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dies 4 that is usually suggested as the most effective way of ensuring the orderly
development of agency policy, the strict adherence to the principles of legality, and the expeditious redress of legitimate grievances. Not surprisingly,
deference by the courts to attempts to develop these nonjudicial procedures
is a first corollary of this perspective. Rather than restrict the number or
scope of these remedies, judges ought to encourage agency responsibility by
facilitating the expansion of mechanisms through which the obvious advantages of the administrative process can be extended to appeal or review
proceedings.
Current theory would have it that there are three distinct forms of administrative control in Canadian law: 5 the general power of superintendence
and review within agency hierarchies," internal second-guessing by way of
statutory appeals, 7 and self-policing by a public authority through its reconsideration of a matter already decided. 8 But because most constitutional and
administrative law courses tend to focus on judicial review of legislation and
government action, the teaching of administrative remedies is rather underdeveloped; in particular, agency reconsiderations have received little doctrinal
attention.9 Moreover, due to the relative infrequency of litigation in this area,
in the past it has been difficult to predict judicial reactions with much certainty. The recent British Columbia Supreme Court decision in Re Lornex Mining
Corporationand Bukwa provides an excellent starting point for the analysis
of when an agency should be permitted to reopen a matter already disposed of.
The facts can be summarized briefly. On December 25, 1973, Dr. Bonnie
Ann Bukwa, a research chemist employed by Lornex Mining Corporation,
complained to the Human Rights Commission of British Columbia, alleging a
breach by Lornex of section 4 of the Human Rights Act.10 The essence of her
complaint was that:
[Co-employees of Lornex of the male sex in positions comparable to hers had
available to them, gratuitously and as part of their employment, accommodation
and board in a camp at the mine site, while such accommodation and board was
not available to her as a female. 11
4 See Garant, Le contr6le de l'administrationprovinciale sur les administrationsddcentralisoes au Quibec (1967), 8 C. de D. 175, and bibliography therein.
5 On this threefold classification, see Dussault, supra note 3, at 988-93. Also see
Abel, Appeals Against Administrative Decisions:IlLIn Search of a Basic Policy (1962),
5 Can. Pub. Admin. 65.
6 For an analysis of the power of superintendence, see Garant, "'Lecontr6le gouvernemental des administrations ddcentralisdes: La tutelle administrative," in Barbe, ed.,
Droit administratif canadien et quibcois (Ottawa: Editions de 'universit6 d'Ottawa,
1969) 223-72.
7 MacKinnon, "Appeals From Provincial Administrative Tribunals," [1971] Special
Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: DeBoo, 1971) 89.
8 Gagnon, Le recours en rAvision en droit administratif (1971), 31 R. du B. 182.
9 For example, Dussault, supra note 3, devotes only two pages to this topic: 13 1012. Reid, Administrative Law and Practices (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) treats reconsiderations in ten pages: 101-10. In Mullan, Administrative Law (Agincourt: Carswell, 1973) rehearings are given only two paragraphs: 94 and 95. Ouellette and P6pin,
Prdcis de contentieux administratif (2d ed. Montr6al: Les Editions Th6mis, 1977) discuss administrative reconsiderations in four pages: 145-49.
10S.B.C. 1969, c. 10, now S.B.C. 1973 (2d Sess.), c. 119.
11 Supra note 1, at 706 (D.L.R.), 555 (W.W.R.).
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A hearing before the Commission was held on May 1, 1974. Following
receipt of the Commission's decision to dismiss her complaint, Dr. Bukwa
wrote to the Vice-Chairman of the Commission in the following terms:
I wish to appeal the decision of the Commission on my case on the basis that I
have new and further evidence and wish to be represented by counsel. I therefore
request a new hearing. 12

A new hearing (or rehearing) was held on August 13, 1974 and, by an

order dated the following day, the Commission not only cancelled its decision
of May 1, but also required Lornex to:
[C]ease the contravention by making camp accommodation available to female
employees on the same terms and conditions as male employees and ... to rectify
the contravention by paying to Dr. Bonnie Ann Bukwa the sum of Two Thousand,
Seven Hundred and Thirteen Dollars ($2,713.00). ... 13

Lornex then applied for certiorarito quash the August 14th order of the
Commission on the grounds:
[F]irstly, that as the Commission had, prior to August 14, 1974, heard the parties
and rendered its decision, it had become functus officio and hence without jurisdiction to conduct an appeal, a rehearing, or a new hearing; and that, in any
event, there was no jurisdiction in the Commission to alter its previous decision in
the absence of new evidence; secondly, that the presence of an allegedly interested
party in the person of the director during the Commission's private deliberations
was a breach of natural justice and voided the decision of the Commission; and
thirdly, that, in any event, the Commission had no power to order payment of
$2,713 as "costs incurred by Dr. Bukwa" or at all.14

On June 30, 1976, Verchere J. gave judgment quashing that part of the
order respecting the payment of money to Dr. Bukwa, but rejected Lornex's
allegation of bias and upheld the cease and desist order. More importantly,
the judge confirmed the jurisdiction of the Commission to have reopened
the hearing of Dr. Bukwa's complaint. 15
Although this decision expands the conditions under which agency reconsiderations will be permitted, and for that reason alone is probably to be
welcomed, for those concerned that the courts develop a coherent theory of
administrative self-review, it is disappointing both in its legal and its policy
justifications. Technically, the judgment is deficient in two respects. First, it
repeats without analysis the questionable proposition that, absent some statutory authority, an agency never has the power to reassess a matter already
determined by it,'1 and, secondly, it uncritically adopts a suspect interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Grillas v. MMI.'7 From a
policy perspective, the judgment is weak because it contributes little to the
development of a workable framework for agency redeterminations and offers
no general principles to guide public authorities as to when or how their
powers of reconsideration should be exercised: the Court neither considers
l2ld. at 707 (D.L.R.), 556 (W.W.R.).
13 Id.
1
4 Supra note 1, at 708 (D.L.R.), 557 (W.W.R.).
1
.rId. at 712 (D.L.R.), 562 (W.W.R.).
I6 Id. at 708 (D.L.R.), 557-58 (W.W.R.).
17 [1972) S.C.R. 577, 23 D.L.R. (3d) 1. Verchere J. refers to the Supreme Court
judgment, supra note 1, at 710 (D.L.R.), 559 (W.W.R.).
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the potential justifications for permitting or forbidding redeterminations, nor
suggests what powers agencies undertaking rehearings should exercise, nor
does it discuss how concepts of estoppel or the vesting of rights may limit
agency second-guessing.
A.

Validity, Finalityand Functus Officio
In Re Lornex, Verchere J.begins his discussion of agency reassessments
with the proposition that express statutory authorization is required before a
public authority may review one of its prior acts. He notes that:
mhe normal rule relating to the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal to rehear a matter already heard and determined by it is that, in the absence of some
18
statutory power, such jurisdiction does not exist ....

Although this principle has been a traditional starting point for judicial treatments of agency reconsiderations, 9 it grossly oversimplifies the analytical
complexity in this area by confusing concepts such as validity, finality and
functus offlcio. In particular, it presupposes the two most important conclusions a court must draw: namely, that a given act is valid, and that it is final
vis-ii-vis the agency making it.

Strictly speaking, the question of agency reconsiderations cannot arise
when a prior act is void. If a first attempted determination is a nullity, any
second consideration is legally only the original exercise of an agency's
power.20 However, courts have often treated the problem of nullities as an
exception to the rule requiring authorization to reconsider. This probably
arises because of the limited ways in which judicial tribunals may render
decisions that are nullities. At common law, courts were permitted to set aside
any of their orders made without jurisdiction.21 But since these jurisdictional
defects were invariably rationes materiae, there was never any question of
courts' redetermining the matter. On the other hand, agency nullities may
result from the breach of mandatory procedural requirements, failure to
afford natural justice, the making of ultra vires orders, or the improper exercise of a discretionary power. In these cases there can be no question that
agencies have jurisdiction to make a proper determination. 22 Although this
18 Supra note 1, at 708 (D.L.R.), 557-58 (W.W.R.).
1

9 See, for example, R. v. Development Appeal Bd., Ex parte Canadian Industries
Ltd. (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 727, 71 W.W.R. 635 (Alta. C.A.); Citg de Jonqui~re v.
Munger, [1964] S.C.R. 45; and Bakery and Confectionery Workers int'l Union of
America v. BCLRB, [1966] S.C.R. 282, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 193.
20 Cf. Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality; A Study in Public Law (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1965) c. I and II.
2
lCraig v. Kanssen, [1943] K.B. 256, [1943] 1 All E.R. 108 (C.A.); Marsh v.
Marsh, [1945] A.C. 271 (P.C.). The common law also permitted courts to reopen decisions on the grounds of fraud: Johnston v. Barkley (1905), 10 O.L.R. 724 (C.A.). Although there seems to be no reason why this principle should not also apply to agency
activity, there is no Canadian authority directly on point.
22
For representative cases, see R. v. JurisdictionalDisputes Comm'n, [1963] 2 O.R.
698, 40 D.L.R. (2d) 833 (H.C.); Re Texaco Exploration Can. Ltd. and Mineral As-

sessment Appeal Bd. (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 754 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); Re Velander's
Certiorari Application, [1971] 4 W.W.R. 757 (B.C.S.C.); Posluns v. Toronto Stock
Exchange, [1964] 2 O.R. 547, 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210, afl'd [1966] 1 O.R. 285, afl'd [1968]
S.C.R. 330; and Morin and Sunbridge Investments Ltd. v. Provincial Planning Bd.,
[1974] 6 W.W.R. 291 (Alta. S.C.).
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reassumption of jurisdiction has usually induced courts into viewing such determinations as reconsiderations, 23 logically, the general principle requiring
authorization to reopen a matter can only apply to valid acts.

Yet the mere fact that agency action is valid does not mean that the
power to reconsider is contingent upon an express statutory provision; such a
clause should be necessary only where an act is also final or conclusive.
Reliance on abstract or general theories of finality would not be fruitful, however, since in administrative law this concept has at least five differing meanings: an act may be final in the sense that findings and conclusions contained
therein are binding against everyone, an act may be final in that it is res
judicata between parties to a litigated dispute, an act may be final in that it
conclusively disposes of a dispute, i.e., is not interlocutory, an act may be
final in the sense that a court or any other body may not review its merits,
and an act may be final in that the agency making it is precluded from reconsidering or revoking it.24 Consequently, for purposes of administrative reopenings, it is necessary to determine specifically when administrative acts are final
vis-ii-vis the agency making them.
Analytically, two competing approaches to finality in this sense may be
taken. From one viewpoint, it could be argued that finality is not an inherent
attribute of statutory power and, therefore, no agency act is final except to
the extent and for the purposes set out by statute. On the other hand, it might
be suggested that finality is the natural corollary of a grant of power and,
therefore, all acts are final vis-b-vis the agency making them unless the legislation provides otherwise. It should be noted, however, that both approaches
treat finality purely as a jurisdictional concept; that is, on either view, the
nature of the statutory power, or the effect of its exercise on parties, is not
considered to bear on the issue of conclusiveness. To this extent, both confuse
agency finality with functus officio and suggest that an act is not final visa-vis the agency making it as long as such agency is not functus officio.25
Nevertheless, since a determination is obviously final (in the sense that the
agency making it cannot revoke or amend it) if the agency is functus officio,
an assessment of these two approaches is a good starting point for any analysis of finality.
The first of these perspectives is supported by the fact that legislatures
often expressly provide that certain agency acts are final. For example, section 95(1) of The Labour Relations Act of Ontario states:
The Board has exclusive jurisdiction to exercise the powers conferred upon it by
or under this Act, and to determine all questions of fact or law that arise in any
matter before it, and the action or decision of the Board thereon is final and
conclusive for all purposes .... 26 (Emphasis added.)
23 Each of the cases cited in footnote 19 is an example of the courts treating invalid decisions as an exception to the principle of conclusiveness. Also see Woldu v.
MMI (1977), 18 N.R. 46 per LeDain J. (F.C.A.).
24
Rubinstein, supra note 20, mentions three of these.
2r Functus officio is defined as "discharged of his authority." See Words and Phrases,
Vol. 2 (2d ed. Toronto: DeBoo, 1964) at 686. That is, it is descriptive of the situation
that arises when a statutory power holder is formally deseized of a matter over which
he once had jurisdiction.
26
R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, s. 95(1).
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If finality were a necessary concomitant of the exercise of a statutory power,
these provisions would be redundant. Consequently, it is argued that in their
absence no determinations are final in any respect.
In response to this view, it is suggested that, while such provisions do
stipulate conclusiveness, they are intended only as privative clauses directed
to the courts and are not addressed to the issue of finality generally. However,
four factors militate against this interpretation. First, the provisions clearly
state "for all purposes." Second, since judges have traditionally treated finality clauses as only precluding appeals to courts, and since such appeals must
be authorized in all cases by statute, if finality provisions were intended
simply as privative clauses they would be unnecessary. Third, some statutes
provide both for "finality" and grant agencies "exclusive jurisdiction, '27 while
others stipulate only that an agency has "exclusive jurisdiction." 28 Finality
clauses, therefore, must be directed to problems in addition to jurisdictional
control by the courts. Fourth, many finality clauses are also accompanied by
provisions expressly permitting reconsiderations.29 Since these express rehearing clauses are rarely attached to "exclusive jurisdiction clauses" which do
not also provide for "finality," it may be assumed that legislatures normally
perceive their utility where decisions are stated to be final.8 0 The above analysis would appear to suggest that there are good arguments for never treating
an agency as functus officio vis-a-vis its determinations unless an express
clause stipulates conclusiveness.
The second general approach, that finality is the natural corollary of a
legislative grant of power, and, therefore, that in principle no agency exercises
a continuing jurisdiction, has found considerable favour with the courts. This
view is justified on three grounds. First, the maxim interest republicae ut finis
litem and analogies to the procedures of trial courts are used to support the
view that statutory jurisdictions are exercisable only once.8 1 Second, it is
suggested that since statutory bodies have no inherent jurisdiction, once a
subordinate body which is given a limited jurisdiction acts, it exhausts its
jurisdiction. 2 Third, it is argued that the very presence of express rehearing
provisions is evidence that legislatures intend agency acts to be final in prinCf. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232.
section 14b(6) of The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1970, c. 318, as
am. by S.O. 1971, c. 50, s. 63:
[Tihe board of inquiry has exclusive jurisdiction and authority to determine any
question of fact or law or both required to be decided in reaching a decision as to
whether or not any person has contravened this Act....
29For example, section 95(1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970,
c. 232 states:
[Blut nevertheless the Board may at any time, if it considers it advisable to do
so, reconsider any decision, order, direction, declaration or ruling made by it and
vary or revoke any such decision, order, declaration or ruling.
30 A rare exception is The Milk Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 273, where s. 26(13) provides
for rehearings even though no finality clause is present. Also see the Immigration Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-2, s. 28; and Re Sparrow and MMI (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 158
(F.C.T.D.).
81
Boiven v. City of Edmonton (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.).
32 For example, In re Appeal of Consolidated Mining & Smelting Co. of Can. Ltd.,
[1947] 2 W.W.R. 769 (Alta. S.C., App. Div.).
27

28 Cf.
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ciple. 3 Thus an agency loses jurisdiction once it performs its statutory mandate, and decisions are final vis-&-vis the agency simply because it has no
continuing power to amend them, i.e., is functus officio.
Unfortunately, neither of these approaches makes much sense when applied as an absolute. The fact that legislatures often expressly enact finality
provisions does not necessarily mean that in their absence an agency exercises a continuing jurisdiction, for it is probably the case that such clauses
appear only when decisions are intended to be final for all purposes. Where
the legislature wishes agency determinations to be final in only one or two
senses, great confusion would be caused by enacting a general finality provision. As a result, although a finality clause should operate to make determinations unassailable by the agency making them, the result suggested by a
contrario reasoning, i.e., absent such a clause an agency cannot be functus
officio, does not logically follow.
On the other hand, the judicial presumption that the exercise of a statutory power automatically renders an agency functus officio seems to be based
on a rather uncritical extrapolation from the principles applicable to the
courts under the Judicature Acts. This approach fails to take into account
the differing kinds of consequences which administrative acts may produce,
the diversity of agency activity, and various legislative presumptions set forth
in the Interpretation Acts. A brief preliminary review of the three usual
agency functions reveals3 4clearly the fallacy of the approach traditionally
adopted by the judiciary.
Insofar as the acts of a public authority are legislative in nature, this
presumption of finality should have no application whatsoever. Not only is
a continuing jurisdiction the essence of a legislative power,3 5 but, in addition,
most Canadian Interpretation Acts contain provisions clearly stating that an
agency exercising legislative powers may revise, revoke or amend any of its
acts. 6 With respect to administrative functions, the authorities appear equally
as certain. Jurisdictionally, there seems to be no reason in principle why all
33

R. v. Development Appeal Bd., Ex parte C.I.L., supra note 19.
The traditional threefold classification as legislative, administrative and judicial
for the purposes of reconsiderations is suggested by Ouellette and P6pin, supra note 9,
at 145-49.
35See Read et al., Materials on Legislation (3d ed. Minela, N.Y.: Foundation
Press, 1973) c. 1, especially at 58-75. In the text I am distinguishing between acts that
are legislative in nature, and those that, although legislative in form, are really judicial
in nature. See further, Moffat, The Legislative Process (1930), 24 Cornell L. Rev. 223.
30For example, section 27(g) of the Ontario Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.
34

225 states:

In every Act, unless the contrary intention appears,
(g) where power is conferred to make by-laws, regulations, rules or orders, it
includes power to alter or revoke the same from time to time and make
others ....

A similar provision is found in section 26(4) of the federal Interpretation Act,

R.S.C. 1970, s. 1-23:
(4) Where a power is conferred to make regulations, the power shall be construed as including a power, exercisable in the like manner, and subject to
the like consent and conditions, if any, to repeal, amend or vary the regulations and make others.

214
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such decisions and determinations cannot be freely reconsidered; most of
these powers are continuing or repetitive, and tend to be exercised within the
larger framework of general agency policy.Y Moreover, the majority of Canadian Interpretation Acts expressly recognize the continuing nature of the
standard functions performed by public authorities.a8
Where an agency determination, be it either legislative"9 or nonlegislative in form, 40 gives rise to a duty to act judicially, it is not illogical to infer
that the power granted is intended to be exercised only once, 4' for it is the
a7Cf. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London: Stevens
& Sons, 1973) at 60-64; and Ouellette and Pdpin, supra note 9, at 148-49. But see Violl
v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1965] S.C.R. 232, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 506.
8 In Ontario, section 27 of The Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 225 provides:
In every Act, unless the contrary intention appears, ...
(e) where a power is conferred or a duty is imposed on the holder of an office as
such, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time
to time as occasion requires;
(1) words authorizing the appointment of a public officer or functionary, or a
deputy, include the power of removing him, reappointing him, or appointing
another in his stead or to act in his stead, from time to time in the discretion
of the authority in whom the power of appointment is vested; ...
Section 26(3) of the federal Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-23 states:
(3) Where a power is conferred or a duty imposed the power may be exercised
and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion requires.
89 The locus classicus as to these situations is Wiswell v. Winnipeg, [1965] S.C.R.
512, 51 D.L.R. (2d) 754. Although the Wiswell case concerned only the question of
whether notice and a hearing were required prior to the enactment of a by-law, there
are dicta in other judgments to the effect that in such circumstances all other concomitants of a judicial or quasi-judicial classification will follow. For example, in Cloverlawn
Investments Ltd. v. Corporation of District of Burnaby, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 628
(B.C.S.C.); and in Re Birnamwood Investment Ltd. and Town of Mississauga (1973), 2
O.R. (2d) 421, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 165 (H.C.), it was held that a failure to give notice of a
by-law hearing gave rise to a nullity that could be corrected upon a rehearing.
40 See Re Lugano and MMI (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 625 at 628 per Jackett C.J.
(F.C.A.).
41
See, for example, the decision in Citd de Jonquiare v. Munger, supra note 19.
Compare 22 Hals. (3d) para. 1660; and Williston and Rolls, The Law of Civil Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths, 1970) at 1061-62:
[A] formal judgment which is not ex parte and which clearly sets out the intention
of the ... officer making it, cannot, after entry, be varied, amended or rescinded
on a new application to the same court, because, after his judgment has been entered, a judge is functus officio.
In R. v. Development Appeal Bd., Ex parte CJ.L., supra note 19, at 731 (D.L.R.),
639 (W.W.R.), Johnson J.A. stated:
The Courts of Chancery at an earlier time did rehear cases. No doubt this practice accounted in part for the delays that were one of the criticisms levelled at
that Court. It is clear that no such right has been permitted since the Judicature
Acts, "the power to re-hear being part of the appellate jurisdiction which is transferred by the Acts to the Court of Appeal": Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879), 12 Ch.
D. 88. The application of this restriction to administrative boards appears to have
been recognized by the Legislature because we find in Acts setting up a number
of these boards express provision for rehearing is made.
Although there is nothing in conventional doctrine to suggest that the principles of
the Judicature Acts apply to administrative agencies, most courts seem to take this
position. For example, in Bowen v. City of Edmonton, supra note 31, the Court applies
the principles of the Judicature Acts so precisely that it held that an agency became
functus officio only upon formal entry of its decision.
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essence of a judicial power that disputes between parties be finally settled.42
Although no Interpretation Act speaks to the issue, Canadian jurisprudence
in this area invariably seems to support such a view. 43 As a result, the conclusion that an agency is functus officio once it exercises any statutory power
cannot be sustained.
Substantial logical difficulties arise, therefore, if either of these approaches
to determining when an agency should be functus officio is adopted absolutely. Yet in combination they do provide certain general guidelines. First, where
agency acts are expressly stated to be final, an agency normally will be functus
officio once it acts. Second, where no finality provision is present, an agency
will be functus officio upon acting only where it exercises powers giving rise
to a duty to act judicially. 44 Third, in either of the above situations, an express clause permitting reconsiderations will negative any conclusion that an
agency is functus officio.
A simple analysis of the concept of functus officio does not, however,
provide a complete understanding of agency finality, for this concept is descriptive only of when an agency formally has no jurisdiction to reopen a
matter. There can be many other factors that might affect the finality of administrative activity. Considerations of estoppel, res judicata or retroactivity
may preclude an agency that formally exercises a continuing jurisdiction, i.e.,
is not functus officio, from tampering with its prior determinations. 45
In light of this discussion, it is obvious that the approach adopted by
Verchere J. is analytically unsound. Even though it reflects the position advanced by many Canadian courts, it should be rejected as a theoretical framework for evaluating when agency self-review should be permitted.
The Grillas Decision
It is because courts usually have failed to distinguish validity from finality,
to assess the implication of finality clauses, or to recognize the diversity of
functions performed by agencies, that the law of reconsiderations has often
been punctuated by judicial decisions that seem to depart from the accepted,
even if unsound, doctrine in the area. In recent years, the most renowned of
these anomalies has been Grillas v. MMI, where the Supreme Court held that
the Immigration Appeal Board could reconsider one of its decisions, even
though no express rehearing clause was present in the governing statute.46 In
Re Lornex, Verchere J. viewed Grillas as an exception to the general rule
requiring statutory authorization, and relied on this decision to justify holding
B.

42 See Holmsted and Langton, Ontario JudicatureAct (5th ed. Toronto: Carswell,
1940) at 1328-40; Supreme Court of Ontario, Rules of Practicer,Rules 517-39; and
Flower
v. Lloyd (1878), 10 Ch. D. 327 (C.A.).
43

See, most recently, Re Texaco Exploration Can. Ltd. and Mineral Assessment
Bd., supra note 22.
Appeal
44
Classification of functions as judicial or administrative for the purpose of determining when agency acts should be final is not a very satisfactory approach, for the
courts have often suggested that a key test for distinguishing a judicial act is its finality.
See, for example, Guay v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 226; and Saulnier

v. Quebec Police Comm'n, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 572, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 545. No analytical insight may be gained from propounding a tautology.
45 These matters are discussed fully in part C of this comment.
46
Supra note 17.
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that the British Columbia Human
Rights Commission had jurisdiction to re47
hear Dr. Bukwa's complaint.
In most discussions of the Grillas case, it is assumed that (1) the absence of an appeal as of right, and (2) the "beneficial" or "compassionate"
nature of the statutory power under review, were the determinative reasons
why the Immigration Appeal Board was deemed to exercise a continuing
jurisdiction. 48 This interpretation was fully accepted by Verchere J. However,
two of the judgments in Grillas suggest other rationes decidendi, which, if
adopted, would mean that the case is rather unexceptional.
First, it may be that the language of section 15 of the Immigration
Appeal Board Act'9 can be read as impliedly authorizing a reconsideration.
Both Abbott J., writing for the majority, and Martland J., dissenting, seem
to have adopted this approach, the latter noting:
[The Act] ... goes on, in s. 15(1), to give to the Board what might be called an
"equitable" jurisdiction, to be exercised at its discretion, in certain circumstances,
even though it has dismissed an appeal against a deportation order.
... In my view, this "equitable" jurisdiction of the Board, under s. 15(1), is a
continuing jurisdiction, and not one which must be exercised once and for all. The
intention of the Act was to enable the Board, in certain circumstances, to ameliorate the lot of an appellant against whom a deportation order had lawfully
been made. It is in accordance with that intent that the Board should have jurisdiction, in cases which it deems proper, to hear further evidence on the issues
involved under s. 15(1), even though it has made an order dismissing the appeal.
In my opinion, the Board had jurisdiction to reopen the hearing of the appellant's
appeal to permit him to present additional evidence.50

In other words, it appears to be the opinion of the Court that the recon-

sideration is authorized not because of the nonexistence of an appeal right
from the exercise of the power under section 15, but rather, because that
section implied that the Board's jurisdiction was "continuing"; i.e., the rehearing provision was tacit, rather than express. 1 Further support for this position
47 Supra note 1, at 708 (D.L.R.), 558 (W.W.R.).

48 See, for example, Ouellette and P~pin, supra note 9, at 146; Dussault, supra note
3, at 1310; Reid, supra note 9, (1976 supp.) at 12; and Re Lugano and MMI, supra
note 40.
49Section 15(1) of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67 (Can.), c. 90
provided:
15. (1) Where the Board dismisses an appeal against an order of deportation or
makes an order of deportation pursuant to paragraph (c) of section 14, it
shall direct that the order be executed as soon as practicable, except that
... (a list of exceptions follows) [in which case] ... the Board may direct that the execution of the order of deportation be stayed, or may
quash the order and direct the grant of entry or landing to the person
against whom the order was made.
50 Supra note 17, at 590 (S.C.R.), 11 (D.L.R.).
81 This interpretation is supported by the recent Federal Court of Appeal decision
in Re Lugano and MMI, supra note 40, at 628, where Jackett C.J. observed:
As I understand it, what the Supreme Court of Canada decided in Grillas v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration ... was that there was a continuing
authority to grant s. 15 relief, which was not terminated by an earlier refusal."
There was no question of setting aside an earlier decision of the Board. What
was held, in effect, was that, even though relief was refused on one body of evidence, there was still jurisdiction to grant relief on other evidence.
*(The footnote refers to section 26(3) of the federal Interpretation Act.)
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may also be derived from the wording of section 22 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act,5 2 which grants the Board exclusive jurisdiction, but does not

provide that any of its determinations shall be final or conclusive.
A second orthodox basis upon which the decision in Grillas may be ex-

plained is suggested by Abbott J. in his observation that:
Whether the discretion to be exercised by the Board under s. 15 be described as
equitable, administrative or political, it is not in the strict sense a judicial discretion, but it would appear it should be exercised essentially upon humanitarian
grounds.6 3 (Emphasis added.)

That is, if the function of the Board cannot in any way be qualified as judicial,

the principles of the Judicature Acts should not apply, and, consequently,
54
the Board should have jurisdiction to reconsider its determination.

If either of these grounds is accepted, the Supreme Court decision is

neither novel nor bizarre. Although it departs from the view that express
statutory authorization is required to vest an agency with a continuing jurisdiction, the case is consistent with the more sophisticated analysis presented
above. More importantly, a further explanation of the judgment in Grillas,
which has not been raised in any subsequent decision or commentary, would
suggest that the case is irrelevant to the question of agency reconsiderations.
5
the Immigration Appeal Board noted that it was conIn Tsantili v. MMI,G
stituted as a superior court of record.5 6 Since superior courts exercise all the
powers that formerly were vested in both Chancery and Common Law Courts,
521966-67 (Can.), c. 90, s. 22 provided: "Subject to this Act and except as provided in the Immigration Act, the Board has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
determine all questions of fact or law, including questions of jurisdiction .. "
63 Supra note 17, at 581 (S.C.R.), 4 (D.L.R.). This interpretation is also supported
by a proposed amendment, which was later withdrawn, to the Immigration Appeal
Board Act. See Draft Bill C-24, November 1976, s. 84:
Where the Board has declared an appeal to be abandoned pursuant to section 78
or has disposed of an appeal by allowing it or dismissing it, the Board shall not
hear any further evidence relating to the appeal or vary any other the terms of its
decision.
The marginal notes to this proposed amendment state:
In the absence of anything to the contrary in the law, the Board has felt obliged
to reopen hearings particularly with respect to its compassionate jurisdiction,
whenever requested to do so, even if the request appeared to be frivolous and
designed only to produce delay. S.84 specifically bars the reopening of cases which
have been declared abandoned by the Board or on which the Board has made a
conclusive decision.
54
In several other decisions, the Immigration Appeal Board has held that it possesses jurisdiction under section 15(1) to reconsider a refusal to exercise its discretion
to stay a deportation order. See Chan v. MMI (1968), 6 I.A.C. 429; Caudill v. MMI
(1968), 6 I.A.C. 426; and Xaviera Allen (Hollander)v. MMI (1976), 11 I.A.C. 156.
55 (1968), 6 I.A.C. 80.
50 Despite the fact that the Immigration Appeal Board considers that it is a superior
court of record, there may be some dispute on this point. Section 7(1) of the Immigration Appeal Board Act, 1966-67 (Can.), c. 90 states: "The Board is a court of record
and shall have an official seal, which shall be judicially noticed." Section 7(2) of the
Act provides: "The Board has, ... all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested
" It is not clear from these provisions whether the
in a superior court of record ...
Board is a superior court of record, or is merely a court of record vested with the
powers, rights and privileges of a superior court. See note 58, infra.
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the Board concluded that the unfettered right to reconsider, which Chancery
possessed prior to the Judicature Acts, is now exercisable by any superior
court of record.57 The reasoning in Tsantili has been expressly adopted by the
Immigration Appeal Board in several subsequent cases, and has never been
directly disputed in either the Federal Court or the Supreme Court of Canada. 68 As a result, notwithstanding the failure of the Supreme Court in Grillas
to advert to this point, it would appear that the "continuing jurisdiction" of
the Immigration Appeal Board arises in law from its constitution as a "court
of record" with "all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a
superior court of record...."
Given these explanations of the Supreme Court decision, to what extent
can the judgment in Grillas be used to justify the decision in Re Lornex?
From an analysis of the reasons of Martland J., the primary question would
appear to be whether the British Columbia Human Rights Act can be read
as impliedly authorizing reconsiderations. Although section 4 of the Act
creates the offence alleged, the powers of the Human Rights Commission are
set out in section 14(6), which provides:
If, in the opinion of the commission, a person named in a complaint referred
under subsection (4) has contravened any provision of this Act, the commission
may ... (a list of powers follows) ... and the order is final.5 9

When compared with the statutory provisions in Grillas, two distinct

reasons would militate against construing this section as impliedly vesting the
Commission with a continuing jurisdiction. First, section 14 provides expressly that decisions of the British Columbia Human Rights Commission are final,
5

7 This analysis was first advanced by Jessel M.R. in Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879),
12 Ch. D. 88 (C.A.), although it was foreshadowed in Bedwell v. Wood (1877), 2
Q.B.D. 626. Cf. 22 Hals. (3d) para. 1664-65. There are suggestions in later cases that
the inherent right to review is restricted to appellate courts. See Meier v. Meier, [1948]
P. 89, [1948] 1 All E.R. 161 (C.A.); and Thynne v. Thynne, [1955] P. 272, [1955] 3 All
E.R. 129 (C.A.). Three times in recent years the Supreme Court of Canada has reheard
a case already determined by it (Rule 61, Supreme Court Rules), but it has never advanced reasons for why it exercised such a power. See Boucher v. The King, [1951]
S.C.R. 265, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 369, replacing after re-argument, [1950] 1 D.L.R. 657;
Poole v. The Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 381, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 449, rehearing, [1967] S.C.R.
554; and Hill v. The Queen (1975), 62 D.L.R. (3d) 193, rehearing, 58 D.L.R. (3d) 697.
58 There have, nevertheless, been several cases that, by implication, would suggest
that the Board is not a superior court. For example, in Wilby v. MM1, [1975] F.C. 636;
and MM! v. Jolly, [1975] F.C. 216, the Federal Court of Appeal, under Rule 1314,
heard combined section 28 and 29 applications; and in Fogel v. MMI, [1975] F.C. 121;
and Re Lugano and MMI, supra note 40, the Court entertained section 28 applications
alone; and in Lugano v. MM!, [1976] 2 F.C. 438; and Mojica v. MMI, [1977] 1 F.C.
458, the Court suggested that section 28 review was unavailable only because of section
29. Each of these cases suggests indirectly that the Board is not a superior court since
it is subject to judicial review. Nevertheless, there is a plethora of cases where the
Court has said that the Board is subject to control only by appeal: Pratav. MMI, [1976]
1 S.C.R. 376; Maslel v. MM!, [1977] 1 F.C. 194; Russo v. MMI, [1977] 1 F.C. 325;
Boulis v. MMI, [1974] S.C.R. 875, 26 D.L.R. (3d) 216; MM! v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R.
850, 36 D.L.R. (3d) 522; Button v. MM!, [1975] F.C. 277; Eggen v. MM!, [1976] 2
F.C. 643; Kalaam v. MMI, [1976] 1 F.C. 112; Adamusik v. MMI, [1976] 2 F.C. 63.
In light of this confusing jurisprudence, it is difficult to conclude whether the Board is
a superior court of record. That it exercises such powers, however, has never been
contested.
59 S.B.C. 1969, c. 10, s. 14.
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whereas no corresponding provision can be found in the ImmigrationAppeal
Board Act. Secondly, the power granted to the Human Rights Commission is
the power to make a binding determination after preliminary negotiations or
settlement attempts have failed. The power exercised by the Immigration
Appeal Board is, on the other hand, the power to mitigate the effects of a
binding determination already made. In one case, a formal decision arises
after consensual measures have failed; in the other, equitable considerations
are structured to temper formal decision. Viewed in this light, the former
procedure cannot be seen as impliedly permitting reconsiderations, since its
principal thrust is to determine authoritatively a dispute that cannot be settled
amicably.
If the reasoning of Abbott J.is adopted, can the decision in Re Lornex
be justified by an appeal to the Grillas case? Are there any aspects of the
powers granted to the Human Rights Commission that would suggest that it
does not exercise a judicial discretion? On the contrary, the determination
under section 14 has all the elements of an adjudicative decision. There are
facts to be applied to pre-existing norms which set out the rights between
individuals. The Act is structured so as to produce pleadings and a "record"
upon which a decision may be taken. 0 Finally, the determination to be made
is not "equitable" or "beneficial." In Grillas, the Board was performing an
appellate function in which it was granted the power to ameliorate the lot of
a person under order of deportation for "compassionate or humanitarian"
reasons. It is in this sense only that section 15 is "beneficial" legislation. In
Re Lornex, however, the Commission was empowered to impose a substantial
civil sanction upon an offender. That the Human Rights Act had the "beneficial" purpose of inhibiting job discrimination cannot, of itself, mean that the
discretion exercised under section 14 is "beneficial" and not "judicial" in the
sense intended by Abbott J.01
The most significant difference between the two cases lies in the fact that
the Immigration Appeal Board exercises the powers of a superior court of
record, whereas the Human Rights Commission is a provincially constituted
administrative tribunal.6 2 Any suggestions of inherent jurisdiction possessed
by the federal Board and deriving from the Chancery Courts, therefore, cannot be applicable to a provincial agency that is not established as a superior
court of record.
0 See, in particular, sections 13, 14(1) through 14(4), and 15.
0l Normally, one associates "beneficiar with the notion of granting a benefit such
as welfare or parole, or with the mitigation of state power, as in citizenship or immigration matters. Beneficial legislation is such that Hohfeldian rights, privileges, powers
and immunities are vested in a private party, and the corresponding duties, no-rights,
liabilities or disabilities are imposed upon the state. From the perspective of Dr. Bukwa,
the B.C. Human Rights Act may be "beneficial" legislation, but to Lornex Mining, the
statute is far from "beneficial." Since almost all statutes are "beneficial" from the point
of view of one party to the dispute, the comments of Abbott J. are meaningless unless
they are restricted to those cases where Hohfeld's duties, no-rights, etc., reside in the
state.
(2 For some of the problems associated with attempts by provincial governments to
invest administrative tribunals with the powers of superior courts, see Re Howard Investments and South of St. James Town Tenants' Assn., [1973] 1 Q.R. 20, 30 D.L.R.

(3d) 148 (H.C.).
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Consequently, the reliance of Verchere I. in Re Lornex upon the Grillas
case as creating a general exception to the ordinary principles of reconsiderations, which he advances as the basis for his decision, is to be questioned. If
the result in Re Lornex is to be considered as correct, it will require justification by an appeal to the underlying policies and principles that ought to animate the law of agency reconsiderations, and not to any supposed rules that
courts have heretofore purported to establish.
C. A Frameworkfor Agency Reconsiderations
The general reliance of Canadian courts on the principle that agency reconsiderations may only be authorized by express statutory provisions has led
to a very erratic law of rehearings. The judiciary has often treated the concept
of finality as a premise, rather than a conclusion, and judges have failed to
appreciate fully the diversity of tasks assigned to administrative agencies.
Hedged in by a framework that bears little connection to either the justification for, or the merits of, reopening a decision, courts have sometimes rendered curious judgments in their attempts to individualize justice. 3 Re Lornex
demonstrates how this inability to develop a coherent policy of reconsiderations is likely to create real confusion for agencies seeking to evaluate their
powers of redetermination.
If the traditional approach, which is vaguely tied to the classification of
functions model, should be rejected whenever statutes do not expressly set out
powers of reconsideration and are silent on the issue of agency finality, what
factors ought to guide the law of rehearings in such cases? 64 Perhaps the most
"3 For example, in Re Carde and the Queen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 559 (Ont.
H.C.), the Court found that Parliament, "by inference," had granted the National Parole
Board the implicit power to correct any injustice created by its own act or orders. On
the other hand, in Bowen v. City of Edmonton, supra note 31, the Court attached no
consequence to an informal public announcement relied upon by the parties, on the
grounds that agency decisions may always be amended before formal entry.
64 In his Administrative Law Text (3d ed. St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1972) Kenneth
Culp Davis suggests at 370:
When statutes are silent and legislative intent unclear, agencies and reviewing
courts must work out the practices and the limits on reopening. The considerations
affecting reopening to take account of new developments or of new evidence of
old developments often differ from those affecting the correction of mistakes or
shifts in judgment about law or policy. Usually the search for a basic principle to
guide reopening is futile; the results usually must reflect the needs that are unique
to each administrative task. Factors to be weighed are the advantages of repose,
the desire for stability, the importance of administrative freedom to reformulate
policy, the extent of party reliance upon the first decision, the degree of care or
haste in making the earlier decision, the general equities of each problem.
In Canada, the best general approach to the problem of review of agency action,
and the policy that ought to sustain it, is Abel, supra note 5. Professor de Smith also
seems to have concluded that the matter is incapable of detailed analysis. He notes at
page 94 of his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, supra note 34 that:
The interests of fairness to individuals whose interests will otherwise be directly
and prejudicially affected may lead courts to attribute binding effect to administrative acts and decisions which the competent authority wishes to repudiate or
rescind. Indeed, it would seem that the legal competence of administrative bodies
to rescind their decisions depends (in the absence of statutory provision for this
matter) at least as much on considerations of equity and public policy as on conceptual classification.
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appropriate place to begin such an inquiry is by asking what are the circumstances (short of simply wishing a second look at the matter) under which
the reopening of a matter already disposed of may be appropriate? Eight such
situations might be suggested: correction of clerical errors or slips, fraud,
ultra vires, error of fact, discovery of new evidence, change of circumstances,
error of law or policy, and change of law or policy.6 5 There is little doubt that
clerical errors or mistakes may be corrected on reopening since, in such cases,
it is not a determination, but merely its recording that is being revised. 66
Furthermore, it is indisputable that if a fraud is perpetrated upon an agency,
or if it acts ultra vires, it should have the power to reconsider its action, for,
in such cases, the issue is validity, not finality. 67 Insofar as the five other
grounds are concerned, all of which presuppose a valid act, it is necessary to
weigh reasons in favour of reopening against reasons opposing reopening a
determination.6 8 Agency finality, therefore, should depend on both the potential effect of revised action and the reasons why revision is sought.
Over the past thirty years, various courts have advanced four distinct
reasons, apart from the concept of functus officio, to justify denying agencies
the power to reconsider in particular circumstances. First, they have suggested
that the principle of estoppel should operate so as to prevent a public authority from altering any act where there has been a detrimental reliance by a
party privy to it.69 Although this view that the Crown or its agencies may be
estopped has found some favour in England, 70 it does not appear to have
been totally incorporated into Canadian law. 71 In any event, the restrictive
conditions attaching to a plea of estoppel would limit the occasions when
such an argument might be raised successfully.
A second reason for denying agencies the power to reconsider is the view
that once a determination affecting the rights of an individual is made, it
65 Ganz, Estoppel and Res Judicata in Administrative Law, [1965] Pub. Law 237
at 243-55 suggests five of these. Others are derived from the principles of the Judicature
Acts. See 22 Hals. (3d) para. 1664.
66 See 22 Hals. (3d) para. 1669; and Williston and Rolls, supra note 41, at 1065-

66 for
technicalities of reopening in such cases.
6T
See 22 Hals. (3d) para. 1666; and Williston and Rolls, supra note 41, at 1062.
This position was expressly confirmed by Re City of Kingston and Mining and Lands

Comm'r (1977), 18 O.R. (2d) 166 at 169 (H.C.).
68

This approach to the problem of finality has been suggested by several authors,

but no criteria beyond the most abstract generalization have been offered. See Davis,
supra note 64; de Smith, supra note 37; and Ganz, supra note 65.
69 See the judgment of Lord Denning in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, [1949]
1 K.B. 227, [1948] 2 All E.R. 767.
70 Lever (Finance)Ltd. v. Westminster London Borough Council, [1971] 1 Q.B. 222,
[1970] 3 All E.R. 496 (C.A.); and R. v. Liverpool Corp., [1972] 2 Q.B. 299 (C.A.).
71
In Re Rothmans of Pall Mall Can. Ltd. and MNR (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 505
at 511, the Federal Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that the estoppel in the Liver-

pool case arose only with respect to the promise of a hearing. Similarly, in Re MultiMalls Inc. and Min. of Transp. and Commun. (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 49, the Ontario

Court of Appeal also offered the opinion that the principle in the Liverpool case would
apply so as to estop the Minister from reneging on a promise to hold a hearing before
deciding. However, there is clearly a difference between holding that the Crown may be
estopped with respect to the procedures it proposes to follow (a jurisdictional issue)

and holding it estopped vis-a-vis decisions validly taken.
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should not be interfered with except by appeal. 72 As Vaisey J. said in Re 56
Denton Road:
[W]here Parliament confers upon a body ... the duty of deciding or determining
any question, the deciding or determining of which affects the rights of the subject, such decision or determination made and communicated in terms which are
not expressly preliminary or provisional
is final and conclusive, and cannot ... be
73
altered or withdrawn by that body.

The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it ties reconsiderations to a
preliminary classification of functions. 4 Furthermore, why should the fact
that a decision affects rights alone be sufficient to brand a determination with
the stamp of finality? Surely, no one suffers if an act is withdrawn or revised
before it is acted upon. The proposition advanced in Re 56 Denton Road
must consequently be rejected, insofar as it is not tied to the estoppel principle.
The courts have also suggested that the principle of res judicata will
preclude an agency from tampering with a decision already taken. 75 Yet res
judicata is merely a description of the relationship between parties to a lis."6
The rationale for the doctrine relates to the necessity of preventing further
litigation with respect to the same dispute or cause of action. In other words,
the concept is designed to prevent a party from collaterally impeaching the
validity of a previous decision to which he was privy, but does not bear on
the powers of an agency to reopen one of its determinations.7
A fourth reason for precluding agencies from reopening their prior determinations is tied to the maxim interest republicae ut finis litem. Yet this
idea itself does not represent an independent principle supporting or opposing
reopenings. Rather, it is the Latin tag attached to the conclusion that the
reasons compelling a reconsideration do not outweigh those for denying a
reassessment. Surely the interest republicae cannot be derived formalistically,
but must be tied to particular factors such as delay, cost, reliance, etc., factors
that will vary in each particular case.
Of the usual reasons advanced by courts for preventing agency reconsiderations, only the doctrine of estoppel seems to have any cogency from an
overall policy perspective. But there are other factors that should be considered by a public authority wishing to reopen a decision, and these may, in
particular circumstances, either enlarge or restrict the scope of the estoppel
principle. In support of the power to reconsider, it may be suggested that the
original decision maker is better situated than anyone else to comprehensively
review his own determinations. Moreover, delay and expense can be avoided
by resubmitting a question to an institution that has the power to make a
decision on the merits, rather than seeking jurisdictional control from a body
72

See Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 30.

[1953] Ch. 51 at 56-57, [1952] 2 All E.R. 799 at 802.
See text accompanying note 44, supra.
75 Re Fernie Mem. Hosp. Soc'y and Duthie (1963), 42 W.W.R. 511, afl'd 43
D.L.R. (2d) 477 (B.C.C.A.).
70
Williston and Rolls, supra note 41; and Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 25-29.
77 See, for example, Caffoor v. Comm'r of Income Tax, Colombo, [1961] A.C. 584,
[19611 2 All E.R. 436 (P.C.).
73
74
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whose powers are restricted to requiring a redetermination of the issue. 78 On
the other hand, individual statutes may provide for alternative remedies that
are better than reconsiderations. For example, informal appeals on the merits
may be preferable since they would not appear to offend the nemo iudex rule.
A requirement of homologation may also guarantee expedient and effective
review. Finally, if agencies are to be permitted substantial powers of reconsideration, problems of unending reassessments may arise. 79 Because of their
variability, the balancing of the above factors can never be the subject of
abstract definition. It is clear, however, that the answer in each case should
depend to some degree on the reasons why a reconsideration is being sought.
As a result, it is necessary to review the circumstances advanced earlier that
may support the reopening of a valid decision.80
The arguments in favour of permitting the reconsideration of a valid act
are probably strongest insofar as errors of law are concerned. Since determinations tainted with such errors are susceptible to quashing on judicial review,
there is no logical justification for denying an agency, which becomes aware
of such an error, the power of rectification.81 Similarly, when a decision results from a misappreciation of the facts, the reasons for granting agencies
the jurisdiction to correct such mistakes are persuasive. After all, which institution is in the best position to put all the evidence into context?82 In any
event, reopenings on the grounds of error of law or misappreciation of the
facts present an obvious issue requiring essentially a yes or no response, so
that interminable requests for reconsideration in such cases are unlikely.
Where the law, agency policy, or circumstances have changed, the arguments in favour of permitting reopenings are less cogent. First, the reopening
of a decision in order to apply an amended legislative provision or to take
into account changed circumstances would offend the retroactivity principle.
Second, a reconsideration in such cases would logically involve more than the
simple revision of an agency act. A reconsideration presupposes a further
analysis of materials extant at the time of the initial consideration. Consequently, review on the basis of changed law, policy or fact would seem to be
tied to situations where the prospective amendment of a prior act would not
retroactively annul an existing determination.
78

This is especially true where the issue involves an alleged intra-jurisdictional
error of law or fact
79
See the quotation in R. v. Development Appeal Bd., Ex parte C.LL., supra note
33, respecting the low repute of the Chancery Courts.
80 See text accompanying note 65, supra.
81 Recent statutory amendments to the grounds for judicial review have widened
the scope of reviewable intra-jurisdictional errors of law. For example, the Ontario
Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1972, Vol. 2, c. 48 envisions review for errors on
the face of the record where a "statutory power of decision" is implicated, while section 281(b) of the Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970 (2d supp.), c. 10 permits review

whether or not the error appears on the face of the record.
82 Review under section 28 of the Federal Court Act encompasses factual errors,
as does section 2(4) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act of Ontario. Moreover, as
D.W. Elliot has demonstrated, even at common law courts often reviewed administrative
decisions on this basis. See Elliott, "No Evidence": A Ground of Judicial Review in
Canadian Administrative Law (1972), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 48.
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Finally, where a reopening is predicated upon the subsequent discovery
of evidence that existed at the time of the first decision, additional factors
require weighing. If material evidence was suppressed by a party adverse to
the one seeking the reconsideration, an agency will have the power to reopen,
since its first decision was tainted by fraud.83 If a rehearing is sought in order
to present evidence that was not withheld, and that conceivably might have
been offered at a first hearing, the arguments against reconsiderations are
persuasive. First, there is no certainty that the additional fact-finding process
will not be prolonged indefinitely. Second, the reason upon which the reconsideration is being sought rests entirely in the hands of the applicant (unlike
any of the other cases where the act of the tribunal or some other third party
gives rise to the desire to reconsider). Third, reconsideration on this ground
would permit an agency to escape the effect of appellate reversal by subsequent alteration of the record. 84 Nevertheless, depending on factors such as
the continuing nature of the event which generates the original agency act, 85
the diligence of the party seeking a reconsideration in his original evidence
and the importance of the evidence sought to be introduced,8 0 reopenings to
consider fresh evidence may be justifiable.
Unfortunately, none of these considerations appear to have been addressed in Re Lornex. The express finality clause of section 14 was not even
adverted to by the Court. Furthermore, the rehearing was sought solely to
present more evidence, yet nothing in the record indicates reasonable diligence by Dr. Bukwa in her original quest for evidence, and there is no indication whether the additional evidence to be adduced was material or persuasive.
Finally, the Court did not address the question of whether Lornex Mining
had in any way relied upon the original determination. On the facts of this
case, the first two factors would militate against reopening the hearing; in fact,
the finality clause should preclude absolutely a reconsideration by the Commission. Consequently, the decision of Verchere J. is likely to lead to conbe relied upon as
siderable confusion in the law of rehearings and should not
87
an authoritative analysis of the area of administrative law.
8

See Re Cook and Morley and Forster, [1950] O.W.N. 739 (H.C.).
In any event, reheaiings should never be permitted once an appellate or review
process has been initiated. On the other hand, the requirement that reconsiderations be
requested as a precondition of review may prevent such cases from arising.
85 For example, in Re Lornex the first decision taken by the Human Rights Commission would not preclude Dr. Bukwa or anyone else from refiling a complaint based
on similar circumstances that continued to exist after the date of the decision. On this
very point, see In the Matter of a Complaint by Jean Tharp Against Lornex Mining
Corp., an unreported and undated decision of the B.C. Human Rights Commission
against which judicial review was sought, sub nom. Lornex Mining Corp. v. Ruff, unreported, June 3, 1977 (B.C.S.C.).
86See McGuire v. Haugh, [1934] O.R. 9, [1934] 1 D.L.R. 534 (C.A.); and Chan
v. MMI, supra note 54, at 437. But compare In re F.(W.) (An Infant), [1969] 2 Ch. 269,
[1969] 3 All E.R. 595.
87 For an indication of the confusion this decision is likely to produce, see Ouellette
and P6pin, supra note 9, at 146-47:
Dans le cas des d6ecisions sans appel, la juridiction accord6e htl'administration pourrait &re consid6re comme se prolongeant dans le temps plut6t que s'exergant une
fois pour tout [sic].. . . Dans un arr8t rdcent, cette ragle a 6t6 appliqu6e h Ia "Human
3
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Conclusion

Fundamentally, one's approach to agency reconsiderations is a product
of underlying views about the utility of judicial review, the calibre and integrity of public servants, and the exportability of the adjudicative model of
decision making. Unfortunately, the courts have not been willing to erect a
theoretical framework within which these underlying beliefs could be articulated. This failure has contributed to an erratic pattern of judicial intervention
that bears little connection to the merits of reconsideration in any given case.
Moreover, commentators have usually restricted their remarks to vague generalizations that really do not focus attention on the policy issues requiring
ventilation.
The decision in Re Lornex is both a symptom and a cause of these
problems. However, analysis of and extrapolation from the judgment of
Verchere J. would permit the following tentative conclusions to be drawn.
First, any act which is a nullity, either because it is tainted by fraud or because it is ultra vires, may be reconsidered. Second, the classification of
agency functions does not really aid in determining when a reconsideration
should be permitted, since many of the factors that affect classification are
themselves directly relevant to the determination of when a reopening should
be permitted. 88 Third, an agency granted the powers of a superior court of
record and exercising appellate functions has an inherent jurisdiction to reopen any matter. Fourth, where legislation provides that agency acts are final,
reconsiderations may only be undertaken if expressly permitted. Fifth, in the
absence of a finality clause, the principle of estoppel may preclude reconsiderations. Sixth, reviewable errors of law, fact or policy may, if a request
is timely, be reconsidered upon application. Seventh, changes of law, fact or
policy may justify a reopening where an agency act is projected on a continuing basis into the future and the revised order operates prospectively.
Eighth, reopenings to consider fresh evidence may be permitted where, despite
reasonable diligence by the applicant, such evidence was not discoverable at
the time of the original determination.
Increased judicial sympathy for the desire by agencies to reconsider matters already disposed of is evidence of a growing sophistication in Canadian
administrative law, yet, a more subtle approach requires careful analysis of
the underlying reasons for a given doctrinal position. To the extent that the
judgment in Re Lornex represents a departure from insensitive judicial interference with agency activity, it is to be welcomed; to the extent that the decision fails to provide a satisfactory analysis of agency reconsiderations, it
merits criticism.

Rights Commission" de Colombie-Britannique et en consdquence, on peut raisonnablement prdvoir qu'elle fera tache d'huile.
Organic criteria such as the abstract nature of the power exercised, and procedural criteria such as the existence of a lis
inter partes, are becoming less important in
88

the classification process, while material criteria such as conclusiveness, the application

of preexisting rules, and the effect of the exercise of a power, are becoming more
significant. Each of the latter three criteria is relevant to the determination of when
an act should be final.

